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foremost with military commanders, but it is preferable to use ‘superior responsibility’ that clearly 
covers both military and civilian leaders
INTRODUCTION
• The doctrine of C/SR basically refers to the responsibility of a superior for
international crimes, falling within the jurisdiction of ICC, committed by
his/her subordinates, because of
i. a failure to prevent the subordinate from committing the crime or
ii. a failure to punish the subordinate after the crime had been
committed
• In other words, c/sr is form of liability for omissions or inactions.
• IL (IHL & ICL) makes it a duty of superior to act to prevent or punish
subordinates’ criminal actions.
• A superior who, in spite of having actual, constructive or imputed knowledge
of subordinates’ wrongful acts & effective control over them, fails to
discharge his/her duty would be criminally responsible under the doctrine of
c/sr.
• I will briefly discuss the:
Evolution of the principle of CR/SR,
Nature of CR/SR
Differences between Individual CR & SR
Rational of superior responsibility
Elements of SR
Defences available to the superiors
2. EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF CR/SR IN BRIEF
• The contemporary notion of C/SR, as a form of criminal
responsibility, emerged in the post World War II era case law.
• It was later codified in AP I to GCs (Arts 86 & 87).
• Today, the concept of c/sr is enshrined in the statutes of all
major ICTs, including ICTY, Art. 7 (3), ICTR, Art. 6(3) & ICC,
Art. 28.
• Thus, the principle that military & other superiors may be held
criminally responsible for the acts of their subordinates is well-
established in conventional & customary international law.
.
3. THE NATURE OF CR/SR
• Although c/sr is now part of IL, its precise legal nature is still open to debate.
For what exactly is the superior responsible?
1. Is it responsibility for complicity?
2. Is it a separate crime for negligence of a superior’s duty to control,
prevent or punish? or
3. Is it a special mode of liability for the crimes committed by
subordinates?
• Some domestic legislation (including that of the UK, which follow Article 28
almost verbatim), criminalizes superior responsibility as a form of complicity.
(See UK International Criminal Court Act 2001, s. 65)
• Others believe, & the Canadian & German legislation imply, that it is a separate
offence of omission, on the grounds that it would be unfair to hold a person
vicariously liable for the serious crimes of another based on a relaxed mental element
THE NATURE OF CR/SR, CONTINUED
• In Hadžihasanovic´ Judge Shahabuddeen challenged the idea
that command responsibility is a form of complicity, opining
that ‘Command responsibility imposes responsibility on a
commander for failure to take corrective action in respect of a
crime committed by another; it does not make the commander
party to the crime committed by that other
(Hadžihasanovic´ Appeal, Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 33. )
• ‘it is absurd to consider a commander a murderer or rapist
because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape.”
Yamashita trial
THE NATURE OF CR/SR, CONTINUED
• Relying, in part, on Judge Shahabuddeen’s opinion, the ICTY Trial Chamber in 
Halilovic´ asserted that:
command responsibility is responsibility for an omission. The commander is
responsible for the failure to perform an act required by international law. This
omission is culpable because international law imposes an affirmative duty on
superiors to prevent and punish crimes committed by their subordinates. Thus ‘for the
acts of his subordinates’ as generally referred to in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal
does not mean that the commander shares the same responsibility as the subordinates
who committed the crimes, but rather that because of the crimes committed by his
subordinates, the commander should bear responsibility for his failure to act. The
imposition of responsibility upon a commander for breach of his duty is to be weighed
against the crimes of his subordinates; a commander is responsible not as though he
had committed the crime himself, but his responsibility is considered in proportion to
the gravity of the offences committed.
Halilovic´ ICTY T. Ch. 16.11.2005 para. 54.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
Individual Criminal Responsibility
• ICR arises when a person directly 
commits or contributes to the 
commission of a crime (such as aiding, 
abetting, planning, ordering, 
instigating, inciting, and joint criminal 
enterprise).
Command (Superior) responsibility
•SR is a distinct form of criminal responsibility
• It arises where a superior failed to prevent or 
punish the commission of a crime by his 
subordinates.
• Thus, the commander or superior  is not 
charged with committing the crime—but 
can be responsible for his or her omission 
relative to his or her subordinates who did 
commit the crime.
• Where an accused is charged with both types of liability for a particular crime, any conviction should be entered pursuant to 
ICR, with the accused’s command/superior position being regarded as an aggravating factor in sentencing.
• For example, where a military commander ordered a crime perpetrated by his subordinates, he should be convicted for 
“ordering” the offence and not for superior responsibility for failing to prevent or punish that offence. 
THE RATIONAL OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
1. To enhance compliance with IHL,
-as implementation of IHL depends on those in command/ superior position & 
-so, it is necessary to hold the commanders/superiors criminally liable 
- for their failures to
-to adequately supervise their subordinates,
- to prevent a crime 
- to punish subordinates’ unlawful behaviour
-the superior cannot turn a blind eye on the crimes committed or about to 
commit by the subordinates
2. To ensure respect for the rule of IL and 
2. To  deter the commission of future crimes
ELEMENTS OF C/SR RESPONSIBILITY
• To hold a person criminally responsible under the doctrine of C/SR for an 
international crime, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
1. Commission of international crimes by subordinates; 
2. Effective command & control over the subordinates (S-S relationship);
3. Knowledge (actual, constructive or imputed);
4. Failure to act; 
5. Causation (added by Rome Statute): The crime resulted because of the superior’s 
failure to properly control the forces under his or her command 
• The elements 1-3 have been adopted by ICTY & ICTR jurisprudence (See
Aleksovski, ICTY, T. 25/6/1999, paras 69-71; Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR, T. 
Ch. II, 21/5/1999) 
• The 4th element, causation, was added by the Rome Statute of ICC (see Art. 28)
1. COMMISSION OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES BY SUBORDINATES
• Art. 28 of the Statute of ICC defines command responsibility as a form
of responsibility for the crimes that are “within the jurisdiction of the
court” as set out in ICC Arts. 6 to 8.
• To hold a superior responsible under c/sr, the subordinate committed or
was about to be commit any of the international crimes
• It is not necessary for the subordinates to have physically perpetrated the
crimes.
• They may have engaged in criminal conduct under any head of liability,
namely perpetration, aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise to
commit crimes, etc.
• It does not matter whether the perpetration committed the crimes in time
of IAC or NIAC.
2. EFFECTIVE COMMAND & CONTROL 
OVER THE SUBORDINATES (S-S 
RELATIONSHIP);
• Existence of S-S relationship depends on whether superior was 
in “effective control”
• It does not matter whether the relationship is de jure (formal –
eg., regular chain of command – armed force) or de facto 
(informal chain of command, eg., rebel groups)
• What matters is that the superior was in ‘effective control’, i.e, 
a material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct (See 
Celebici case) - Substantial influence is not enough (See Bemba 
Gomba case, ICC)
• How to establish whether the superior was in effective control?
-He/she issued orders, which were obeyed
G. Yamashita ordered his soldiers to leave Manila, but most of 
them did not followed the order yet he was tried & convicted for the war 
crimes committed by those soldiers- A wrong decision
-He/she had capacity to alter command structure, promote or remove & the 
ability to require people to engage or withdraw from hostilities
• These are some of the evidences of effective control.
• The perpetrator does not need to be directly subordinated to the superior, but 
can be several steps down the chain of command
• If two or more superiors have effective control, they can both be found 
criminally liable
3. KNOWLEDGE (ACTUAL, CONSTRUCTIVE OR 
IMPUTED)
• Superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had 
been committed
• Mens rea or mental element
• SR is not a form of strict liability (ICTY, Čelebic´i Appeal paras. 226 and 239
• It has to be established by evidence
• The ICTY has determined that:
“[A superior] ... may possess the mens rea for command responsibility where: (1) he
had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes ... or (2) where he had in his
possession information of a nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the
risk of such offences by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to
ascertain whether such crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his
subordinates.”
Čelebic´i Appeal 223 and 241
• ‘Knew’ means having actual knowledge
• Actual knowledge can be determined by 
i. a direct proof, or
ii. with reference to circumstantial evidence.
• Relevant circumstantial evidence includes
-‘the number, type and scope of illegal acts, 
-time during which the illegal acts occurred, 
-geographical location, 
-whether the occurrence of the acts is widespread, 
-modus operandi of similar illegal acts
• ‘Had reason to know’ or ‘should have known’ is a negligence standard, and 
that failure to seek out information could lead to liability.
G. Yamashita 
His subordinates did commit 
war crimes in an IAC in 
Manila but he had no 
knowledge of it and yet he 
was convicted –what a 
controversial case?
4. FAILURE TO ACT. 
• Superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof
• The principle of CR comprises two distinct legal duties for 
superiors:
1.  to prevent future crimes and 
2. to punish perpetrators of past crimes. 
• The measures which “can be taken [should be) within the
competence of a commander as evidenced by the degree of
effective control he wielded over his subordinates ... What
constitutes such measures is not a matter of substantive law but
of evidence.”
Blaškic, ICTY Appeals Chamber
• A Pre-Trial Chamber in the ICC has taken the view that the relevant 
measures include:
(i) to ensure that superior’s forces are adequately trained in IHL;
(ii) to secure reports that military actions were carried out in
accordance with IL;
(iii) to issue orders aiming at bringing the relevant practices into
accord with the rules of war;
(iv) to take disciplinary measures to prevent the commission of
atrocities by the troops under the superior’s command
Bemba Gombo para. 438
• In relation to the duty to punish, the Oric´ Trial Chamber noted that: 
“the duty to punish commences only if, and when, the commission of a crime by a
subordinate can be reasonably suspected. Under these conditions, the superior has to
order or execute appropriate sanctions or, if not yet able to do so, he or she must at
least conduct an investigation and establish the facts in order to ensure that offenders
under his or her effective control are brought to justice. The superior need not conduct
the investigation or dispense the punishment in person, but he or she must at least
ensure that the matter is investigated and transmit a report to the competent
authorities for further investigation or sanction ... Since the duty to punish aims at
preventing future crimes of subordinates, a superior’s responsibility may also arise
from his or her failure to create or sustain, amongst the persons under his or her
control, an environment of discipline and respect for the law.”
• Turning a ‘blind eye’ to international crimes is clearly unreasonable in this respect
• However, a superior is not ‘obliged to do the impossible.’
4. CAUSATION
• ICTY and ICTR find it difficult to recognized causation as an element of SR
• The Rome Statute of ICC makes it an element 
• However, causation only applies to failure to prevent crime
• It does not apply to failure to punish the crime
• A Pre-Trial Chamber in the ICC stated that:
• There is no direct causal link that needs to be established between the
superior’s omission and the crime committed by his subordinates. Therefore,
the Chamber considers that it is only necessary to prove that the commander’s
omission increased the risk of the commission of the crimes charged in order
to hold him criminally responsible under article 28(a) of the Statute
Bemba Gombo paras. 424–5.
ARE THERE ANY DEFENSES?
• All those elements discussed above can be relied as defenses:
-Subordinates did not commit international crimes;  or
-No power or effective control over those who committed the crimes; or
-No knowledge, actual, constructive or imputed,  of what was going on
-Necessary and reasonable measures were taken to prevent and punish the crimes
-Failure to prevent was not the cause of the crime
• Other defences under the Rome Statute including defences of insanity, intoxication,
self-defence (including defence of others or, exceptionally, property), duress,
necessity (Art. Article 31), mistakes, superior orders (Articles 32 &33) may or may
not be applicable to c/sr
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